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Abstract
We show in a public goods experiment on three continents that conditional cooperation is 
a universal behavioral regularity. Yet, the number of conditional cooperators and the 
extent of conditional cooperation are much higher in the United States than anywhere else.
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Table 1
Distribution of player types
U.S. Austria Japan
Distribution Av. uncond. contrib. Distribution Av. uncond. contrib. Distribution Av. uncond. contrib.
Conditional cooperators 80.6% [29] 9.0 (5.6) 44.4% [16] 8.9 (7.6) 41.7% [15] 9.2 (7.7)
Free riders 8.3% [3] 0.0 (0.0) 22.2% [8] 2.9 (7.0) 36.1% [13] 3.5 (6.3)
Hump-shape contributors 0.0% – 11.1% [4] 7.0 (7.7) 11.1% [4] 11.0 (4.7)
Others 11.1% [4] 7.8 (8.4) 22.2% [8] 8.4 (7.6) 11.1% [4] 10.8 (8.3)
Note: Av. uncond contrib.=average unconditional contributions; absolute numbers in brackets (out of 36 in each location); standard deviations in parentheses.studies provide insights on the generality of conditional cooperation,
but none provides a direct cross-country test by eliciting individual
contributions to a public good as a function of others' contributions.1
In this paper, we attempt to fill this void by investigating the
existence and extent of conditional cooperation across three countries
on three different continents. By running identical public goods
experiments in North Carolina (United States), Tyrol (Austria), and
Tokyo (Japan), we test for the ubiquity of conditional cooperation and
possible cultural differences.
Our results indicate that conditional cooperation is prevalent on all
three continents. The distribution of player types such as conditional
cooperators and free riders as well as the extent of conditional
cooperation, however, differs across countries. There are more
conditional cooperators and fewer free riders among subjects in the
U.S. location than in the Austrian and Japanese location. Also, the
extent of conditional cooperation is stronger, on average, in the United
States than in the two other countries, even though unconditional
contributions to a public good do not differ across continents (as, for
instance, already established by Brandts et al., 20042).
2. Experimental design and procedure
Our experimental design builds upon the standard voluntary
contribution mechanism with the following linear payoff function:
πi ¼ 20−gi þ 0:6 ∑
3
j¼1
gj; ð1Þ
where gi denotes the contribution of subject i to the public good. Each
group consists of n=3 randomly assigned subjects, and each subject
receives an endowment of 20 tokens. The marginal per capita return
(MPCR) from investing in the public good is 0.6.
Assuming that participants are rational and selfish payoff max-
imizers, it is obvious that any MPCR b1 yields a dominant strategy for
every group member to free ride, i.e., to contribute nothing to the
public good. From a social or efficiency perspective, it is, of course,
optimal to contribute the whole endowment because MPCR·nN1.
The details of the preference elicitation and the incentive
mechanism in our experiment follow Fischbacher et al. (2001).
Subjects are asked to make two types of decisions: an unconditional
contribution to the public good, and a conditional contribution.
The unconditional contribution is a single integer number that
satisfies gi≤20. For the conditional contributions, subjects have to
indicate how much they would contribute to the public good for any1 For instance, Croson and Buchan (1999) find similar gender-specific cooperative
behavior in a trust game across the United States, China, Japan and Korea (see also the
related studies by Buchan et al., 2004, 2006). Kachelmeier and Shehata (1997) report
similar expectations of cooperation in a voluntary contribution game across Canada,
Hong Kong and China. Henrich et al. (2005) analyze cross-cultural differences in
cooperation within small-scale societies but they do not focus on conditional
cooperation. The only exemption to our knowledge is a recent study by Herrmann
and Thöni (2007), who conducted experiments in Russia based on the design by
Fischbacher et al. (2001). They do not report any significant differences in behavior
between Swiss and Russian subjects.
2 Cason et al. (2002) provide evidence for a difference in public goods provision
between the United States and Japan, but they use a somewhat more complicated
game than the voluntary contribution mechanism.possible average contribution of the two other players within their
group (rounded to integers). For each of the 21 possible averages from
0 to 20, subjects must decide on a contribution between and including
0 and 20. In the experimental instructions it is stressed that subjects
are completely free in choosing their contribution levels and
contributions do not need to vary for different averages.3
In order to ensure incentive compatibility, both the unconditional
as well as the conditional contribution are potentially payoff relevant.
For one randomly selected groupmember the conditional contribution
is relevant, whereas the unconditional contributions are relevant for
the other two group members. More specifically, the two uncondi-
tional contributions within a group and the corresponding conditional
contribution (for the specific average of the two unconditional
contributions) determine the sum of money contributed to the public
good. Individual earnings can then be calculated according to Eq. (1).
The experiment was conducted with identical procedures at
Appalachian StateUniversity (United States), theUniversity of Innsbruck
(Austria) and the University of Tokyo (Japan). At each location the
experiment was runwith paper and pen, subjects were seated far away
from each other to guarantee privacy, and group composition was not
revealed to the subjects. Subjects receivedwritten instructions thatwere
read aloud by the instructor. In order to ensure that all participants
understood the task completely, participants were given 10 control
questions. After completion of the questionnaire, the questions were
publicly solved. Any remaining questionswere answered in private. The
public goods game was only played once.4
To ensure comparability of the data, we implemented several
safeguards. For example, we strictly followed a single fixed and
written protocol that precisely dictated each step of the sessions. To
ensure equivalence of instructions and to avoid unwanted language
effects, instructions were first written in English, then translated into
German and Japanese, and then translated back into English by
another person and checked for possible disparities.5
The sessions involved 36 participants at each location and lasted
about 70 min. We had participants from various fields of study, and
their socio-economic characteristics were similar across countries.
Subjects were informed that their decisions and their final payment
would remain confidential. The average earnings of 14.6 euro were
paid in cash immediately after the experiment.
3. Experimental results
The unconditional contributions are, on average, 8.11 tokens in the
U.S.A, 7.53 tokens in Austria, and 7.22 tokens in Japan. They are not
significantly different across the three countries, neither when using a
Kruskal Wallis test (pN0.6), nor in any pairwise comparison (two-
sided Mann–Whitney-U-tests; pN0.1 in each case). This null-result3 The instructions can be found on the following website: http://www.lrz-
muenchen.de/~u516262/webserver/webdata/publications.html.
4 The existing literature shows that one-shot and repeated games provide very
similar results, i.e., conditional cooperation preferences are pretty robust with respect
to design features such as the number of repetitions (compare Fischbacher et al., 2001
and Fischbacher and Gächter, 2006).
5 Though safeguards were undertaken, there is always a residual potential for
unobserved confounding effects across locations that influence results.
Fig. 1. Average conditional contributions.confirms prior findings on the robustness of the voluntary contribu-
tion mechanism with regard to differences in cultural and social
variables (see Zelmer, 2003; Brandts et al., 2004).
We follow convention by defining four general types of players:
conditional cooperators submit a contribution schedule that is
monotonically increasing with the average contribution of the other
group members.6 Hump-shape contributors (also called triangle
contributors) submit amonotonically increasing contribution schedule
up to an average contribution of others of xb20. Above x conditional
contributions are monotonically decreasing. Free riders contribute
nothing for any average group contribution. The type Others refers to
the remaining subjects. Table 1 reports the distribution of players.
The distribution of types is not significantly different (pN0.5; Chi2-
test) between Austria and Japan. Especially the relative frequency of
conditional cooperators is almost identical (and closely matches
previous numbers in Fischbacher et al., 2001, and other studies). The
only noteworthy difference is the slightly higher number of free riders
in Japan than in Austria.7
Turning to the United States, we observe a much higher number of
conditional cooperators and fewer free riders there. The difference
between U.S. subjects and participants from the other two countries is
highly significant (pb0.01 for each comparison; Chi2-tests). Note that
the number of hump-shape contributors and the number of other
types are even smaller in the U.S. Thus if one wants to take them as an
indirect indicator for possible confusion, we can confidently conclude
that confusion is very likely not the driving force of our results.
Fig. 1 shows the relation between one's own conditional contribu-
tion (on the vertical axis) and the other members' average contribu-
tion (on the horizontal axis). Note that subjects in the United States are
closest to the 45-degree line – which would indicate perfect6 Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2006) also count subjects
without a monotonically increasing schedule as conditional cooperators in case they
have a highly significant (at the 1%-level) positive Spearman rank correlation
coefficient between own and others' contributions.
7 Roth et al. (1991) also report for an ultimatum game that behavior in Japan is, on
average, closer to the standard game theoretic predictions than in Europe.conditional cooperation – for all average contributions of the other
group members above 4 tokens. In fact, the gap is widening between
Austria and Japan on the one hand side and the United States on the
other hand side the further right we move in Fig. 1. A regression
analysis confirms that the slope of the conditional-cooperation line is
significantly higher for the United States than for Austria and Japan,
meaning that subjects in the United States have a smaller self-serving
bias in conditional cooperation.8
Finally, notice the average unconditional contributions of the
different types of players provided in Table 1. The fact that they are
very close to each other is another indication that the behavior of
subjects on the different continents is very consistent. The noteworthy
difference, though, is that the number of conditional cooperators is
significantly higher and the extent of conditional cooperation is
stronger in the United States than in Austria and Japan.
4. Conclusion
Our results suggest that the nature of conditionally cooperative
behavior may vary across cultures. Comparing behavior across locations
in Austria, Japan, and the U.S., we have found that both the relative
frequency of conditional cooperators and the extent of conditional
cooperation, i.e., the slope of the relation between others' contributions
and own conditional contributions, is significantly higher among U.S.
participants in our experiment than elsewhere. Sincewe do not observe
any difference in unconditional contributions (confirming previous
results), it is not surprising that the difference in conditional contribu-
tions has been missed so far. Given the potential implications of the
extent of conditional cooperation for, e.g., tax policy or charitable giving,
we believe that more empirical evidence substantiating our results in
similar environments or even in the field through the help of controlled
field experiments is required before drawing far-reaching conclusions.8 We ran both an OLS regression that takes the clustering of the data into account
and a Tobit regression that corrects for the censoring of the dependent variable. Both
regressions strongly confirm our conclusion. Results are available upon request.
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